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Abstract
The regulatory environment in a country is an important factor affecting firm performance.
This study investigates the impact of a particular regulation, namely license requirements
for certain firm activities, on the innovation performance of Indian firms. Using a firm
level panel data set, it shows that removal of license requirements led to roughly eight
percentage points faster innovation rates within two years following the reform where
innovation is measured as introduction of new product varieties that had not existed in
the market. When the residual increase in sales revenues even after controlling for the
product innovation is called as process innovation, substantial improvements in process
innovation are also observed. The results are robust to inclusion of controls for the other
policy reforms that occurred during the period of licensing reform, and persist in different
subcategories of firms.
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1. Introduction
Since the seminal works of Grossman and Helpman (1993) and Aghion and Howitt (1992),
many studies have found technological innovation to be the main determinant of growth.
There are structural factors like human and physical capital levels that affect innovation
performances of firms. The regulatory environment and investment climate in a country also
play important roles for the success of technology adoption strategies and innovative efforts.
This study provides an empirical analysis of how regulatory environment affects innovation.
It focuses on a particular product market regulation that was reformed in India in mid 1980s
and then again in early 1990s and shows how this reform affected introduction of new product
varieties and process improvements in formal manufacturing sector.
There are a number of papers that investigate the relationship between different aspects
of regulatory environment, investment climate, and innovation. Aghion, Blundell, Griffith,
Howitt, and Prantl (2009) focus on liberalization of foreign firm entry to U.K. market and
find that technologically advanced entry by foreign firms has a positive effect on innovation
in sectors that are initially close to technological frontier. In another study Aghion, Bloom,
Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005) use a sequence of competition policy reforms to investi-
gate how product market competition level affects innovation performances. They find that an
inverted U-shape relationship between product market competition and innovation outcomes.
(Chamarbagwala and Sharma, 2011) revealed that the delicensing in 1980s in India raised
the relative demand for skilled workers, and emphasized the role of capital- and output-skill
complementarities in this transition. Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010a)
relate international trade to innovation. They show that liberalization of tariff rates which led
to imports of new intermediate goods that were not available in the market before increased
the rate at which firms introduce new products to the market.
Following this literature, we analyze the effects of India’s licensing reform on firms’ inno-
vation performances. Before the reform all firms were required to obtain a license to establish
a new factory, significantly expand capacity, start a new product line, or change location. Li-
censing reform meant freedom from constraints on output, inputs, technology usage, and loca-
tion choice as well as easier entry into delicensed industries. Freedom from these constraints
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allowed firms to take advantage of economies of scale, more efficient input combinations, and
newer technologies. Furthermore, greater domestic competition as a result of free entry into
delicensed industries provided firms with incentives to innovate, increase productivity, and
improve product quality.
Most of the existing studies on innovation use patenting activity/citations, total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP), and data from innovation surveys.1 The main innovation measure we use in
this paper is introduction of new products to the market. This information is available for a
large number of firms over a six year period. The use of such direct measure of innovation ac-
tivities differentiates this study from most of the existing work with firm-level datasets. TFP
measures have the well known problem that they are biased in the presence of imperfectly
competitive product markets. Moreover there is a general problem with interpreting TFP
findings as they usually use revenue data which makes it difficult to identify the effects of
policy reforms on physical efficiency separately from its the effects on firm markups, product
quality, and in the case of multiproduct firms the range of products produced by the firm (see
Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) and Katayama, Lu, and Tybout (2009)). The patent
data provides a better measure of innovation compared to TFP or innovation survey data but
it usually has low data coverage. Moreover in developing countries the patenting mechanism
usually does not work efficiently and thus provide a very limited picture of overall innovation
activities.
There are several studies that analyze the effects of licensing reform in Indian economy.
In one of these studies Aghion, Burgess, Redding, and Zilibotti (2008) analyze how the effects
of this reform on industrial output varies across states with differing restrictiveness of labor
regulations. Our analysis differs from their work in two main aspects. We use a firm level
panel dataset whereas their data is at industry level. Hence the policy question we investigate
is how the reform affects firm dynamics rather than industry dynamics. Their focus is on the
complementarity between the delicensing reform and other labor market regulations whereas
ours is directly on innovation and growth. In another study Chari (2010) focuses on the effects
of the licensing reform on total factor productivity. Using the same dataset as Aghion et al.
1An example of these surveys is Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) which is developed by European Com-
mission for member countries of European Union.
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(2008) he concentrates on the licensing reform in 1985. Lack of a panel dataset prevents to
perform a firm-level productivity analysis using a production function estimation method. It
also prevents to observe the heterogeneity in firms’ responses to the policy change. Using the
same dataset as Aghion et al. (2008), Chamarbagwala and Sharma (2011) analyze the effect
of licensing reform on skill upgrading where they measure skill upgrading as employment
and wage bill shares of white-collar workers. None of these studies can analyze growth at
firm level as the data they use is a repeated cross-section of firms. Our use of firm-level panel
data gives us the advantage of controlling for firm-specific unobservables while quantifying
the impact.
Removal of the distortive regulations can have significant contribution to firm perfor-
mance. The analysis of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) on within-industry dispersion in factor
productivities in China and India show that the removal of plant-level distortions could re-
sult in as much as a 30% improvement in aggregate productivity. Chari (2011) shows that the
licensing reform in India improved productivity by 22%.
A further advantage of our empirical setting is that we can conduct a number of placebo
and robustness tests. These tests have the ability to falsify any spurious link from delicens-
ing to firms’ innovative output. In particular, we use the year and two years before an actual
reform as placebo reform years. We also restrict the sample by excluding firms that are heav-
ily influenced from the concurrent reforms to confine only the impact of delicensing reform.
Also, we narrow down the sample to include only a balanced firm sample to abstain from any
specious inference that is caused by firm entry and exit in our sample.
In this study, we show that the licensing reform increased product innovation rate by
around eight percentage points within the two years following the delicensing reforms. We
find positive and significant impacts of delicensing on firm productivity and sales which can
also proxy for process innovation. One channel for the observed increase in firm product
scope can be the productivity boost caused by delicensing. For identifying this channel we in-
strument the contemporaneous firm productivity with lagged reform variables and find a sig-
nificant impact on firm product scope through firm productivity. We attribute the remaining
impact on sales revenue even after controlling for product innovation is due to the unobserved
process innovations and quality upgrades of products.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we explain the data
and the various policy reforms that were implemented in India. In section 3, we present
descriptive analysis of the licensing reform, the empirical model, and discuss the estimation
results. We finish with some concluding remarks.
2. I. Data and Policy Reforms in India
2.1. Data Description
Firm level data used in the analysis is obtained from Prowess Database which is con-
structed by Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE) in India. This dataset has
advantages over the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) which is the India’s manufacturing
census. ASI is constructed from a repeated cross section of firms whereas Prowess database
includes a panel of firms. The panel feature allows us to tract firms over time. It is also among
the few databases that records annual information on firms’ product mix. Hence product cre-
ation and destruction can be tracked at firm level. This unique feature of the data allows
us to evaluate the relationship between firms’ adjustment of their product lines and policy
changes. There are several innovation strategies that firms can follow. They can introduce
process innovation by significantly improving their production processes or they can intro-
duce product innovation by introducing a new product variety that they did not produce be-
fore. Studies like Bertschek (1995), Parisi, Schiantarelli, and Sembenelli (2006), and Fritsch
and Meschede (2001) highlight the differences between these two innovation strategies. The
data from Prowess are appropriate for analyzing product innovation strategy which will be
measured by the change in product mix of firms.2 Sales revenue and measured productivity
numbers from (Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011) also help indirectly identify the impact on
process innovation. The database contains information from income statements and balance
sheets of publicly listed (relatively large sized) Indian firms from 1989 to 1995. This dataset
is well suited for the particular purpose of the study as large firms contribute more to aggre-
2 The partial model to be introduced in the following section can be easily expanded to include process inno-
vation by adding a quality attribute to the products innovated and firms can be allowed to invest in both quality
improvement and product innovation. An older version of (S¸eker, 2012a) which is available upon request provides
such a setup.
4
gate product creation compared to small firms. As discussed in Goldberg et al. (2010a) the
dataset is not well suited to analyze entry and exit dynamics because firms are not obliged
to report to the data collecting agency. Goldberg et al. (2010a) uses data from 1989 to 2003
and present that prowess database accounts for 60% to 70% of the economic activity in the
organized industrial sector and account for 75% of corporate taxes. The panel in this study is
unbalanced and the number of firms included in the data increases from 752 in 1989 to 2,293
in 1995. Only manufacturing firms are included in the analysis.
In the data product level information is available for around 85% of the firms in man-
ufacturing sector. Products are defined according to CMIE’s internal product classification.
Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010b) present a detailed description of the
data, product classification, and product mix change. They identify 1,886 products linked to
108 four digit 1998 version of National Industrial Classification (NIC) industries in manufac-
turing sector and they find that products that can be mapped to four or five digit NIC codes
account for 99 percent of total output. They also show that the number of products classified
in India is quite comparable to the number found in Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010) for
US manufacturing sector.
[Table 1 about here.]
The Prowess database has been used in a series of papers by Goldberg et al. (2010a,b),
Chari and Gupta (2008), and Krishna and Mitra (1998) among many others. From this
database we use the number of products produced by a firm, and total sales. Descriptive
statistics for these variables are presented in Table 1. An average firm of the regression sam-
ple has 1.95 products and average product growth rate in the economy is 6%. The data shows
that average product addition is more frequent than product dropping. A discussion of this
high product creation is presented in Goldberg et al. (2010b). The table also shows the overall
variation, over time variation for each firm (within), and variation between firms (between)
for each variable. Between firm variation is higher than within firm variation for the left hand
side variables of the empirical analysis -number of products,and sales -, which is expected due
to short time period.
[Table 2 about here.]
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Multi-product firms make around 45% of the firm population in the data. An average
multi-product firm produces around 3 products and these firms make around 80% of total
sales. A descriptive analysis of evolution of multi-product and single product firms is pre-
sented in Table 2. The table shows the percentage of firms that showed various product
evolution patterns annually, over three and five year periods for 1989-1995 period. The re-
sults presented in Table 2 are quite similar to those found in Goldberg et al. (2010b) who
constructs the same table for 1989-2003 period. Percentage of firms that change their product
mix increases over longer time periods. Over five year period around 40% of firms add or
drop a product. Adding new products is much more common among Indian firms than drop-
ping existing products and it is more common among multi-product firms than single-product
firms.
Figure 1(a) depicts the evolution of average number of products for the firms that have
been delicensed within the sample time period (delicensed) and otherwise. 1(a)and (b) plot
the time series for average firm product scope and real sales. As it is presented in Table 3 a
big majority of delicensing took place towards the end of 1991 in our sample and the figure
points that there is not a distinct trend difference before 1992. After 1992 an upward trend
break occurs for average number of product and real sales revenue series for the delicensed
firms sample. Panels (c) and (d) illustrates the residuals from regressing firms’ number of
products and real sales on firm and indsutry(NIC2)-year fixed effects, respectively, which are
the default set of fixed effects that the analysis of the following section is going to control for.
Since we use difference-in-differences methodology in our empirical analysis, although panels
(c) and (d) do not present a perfect parallel trend in the pre-treatment era, the deviation from
parallel trends may signal about a possible underestimation of the impact of delicensing on
product scope an sales.
[Fig. 1 about here.]
2.2. Economic Reforms in India
We complement the data from Prowess with several other data sources to investigate
whether the economic reforms that took place in India affected innovation. Starting from
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1980s, India liberalized its economy by dismantling government controls over industries and
also opened up to trade. One of these reforms is on product market regulations. Up until
1985, Industries Act of 1951 brought all key industries in the registered manufacturing sec-
tor under central government control through industrial licensing. Under this act firms were
required to get a license to establish a new factory, significantly expand capacity, start a new
product line, or change location. The granting of the licenses was subject to heavy bureau-
cracy. Moreover, firms were discouraged to pursue investment projects because each project
would require multiple licenses. In 1985 after Rajiv Gandhi’s rise to the power, a group of the
industries were delicensed.
Later in 1991, as a part of the structural reforms pursuing the Balance of payments crisis,
licenses were removed for another group of industries. A number of industries were retained
from the licensing reform due to security and strategic concerns, social reasons, hazardous
nature of the products, and to elitist consumption.3,4
Licensing reforms were mostly unanticipated.5 In Table 3, we present the percentage of
firms that belong to a 4-digit NIC industry that has been delicensed. In 1989 around 40%
of the firms belonged to an industry that was delicensed on or before 1988. In 1992, the
share of delicensed firms more than doubled. India had several other major market reforms
in the same time period. One of these reforms was on international trade. Average tariff
rates and non-tariff barriers were among the most restrictive in Asia towards the end of
1980s. There has been radical changes in economic policies during 1990s and Topalova and
Khandelwal (2011) show that average tariff rates declined from 97% in 1989 to 46% in 1995.
They also show that there were significant decreases in the share of products that are subject
to quantitative restrictions which went down from 87% in 1987 to 45% in 1994.6
[Table 3 about here.]
Controlling for input tariff rates is particularly important because Goldberg et al. (2010b)
3There were few industries that were delicensed in other years than 1985 or 1991 such as manufacture of
domestic appliances, n.e.c which was delicensed in 1993.
4Aghion et al. (2008) and Chari (2009) provide a detailed discussion of this reform and list the industries that
were delicensed and when they were delicensed.
5Aghion et al. (2008) provide a discussion of this conclusion.
6Goldberg et al. (2010b) explain that the tariff liberalization up until 1997 was unanticipated, not targeted
toward specific industries, and they were free of political economy pressures.
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find that reduction of input tariff rates significantly increased innovation capacities of firms.
Hence, the relationship between licensing reform and innovation can be biased if the effect
of tariff reform is not controlled for. Indian government also reduced the barriers to foreign
direct investment in a group of industries after the balance of payments crisis in 1991. The
reform allowed majority ownership rights to foreign firms. The FDI variable takes a value of
zero before 1991 in all industries when FDI was strictly controlled. After that year it shows
the percentage of the industry that is opened to FDI. Foreign held companies are usually
better at technology adoption and they are more innovative than domestic firms. They can
get easier access to technology, capital resources, and R&D facilities of the parent company
which facilitate innovation and growth.7
The trade liberalization and FDI reforms can affect innovation performances of firms. In
the empirical analysis we test whether the licensing reform increased innovation capacities of
firms controlling for all these changes as well as firm specific factors that affect their evolution.
3. Empirical Analysis
In theoretical models there are two margins of firm dynamics. The first one is the dynam-
ics of incumbent firms and the second one is the entry/exit margin. Although entering and
exiting firms contribute to reallocation of resources and aggregate innovation in an economy,
Prowess database does not allow us to analyze their dynamics. Firms can exit and re-enter
the database. Since it is not possible to identify new entrants and actual exiting firms, the
empirical analysis does not discuss the contribution of entrants and exiting firms to aggre-
gate innovation. Goldberg et al. (2010a) also use the Prowess database and provide a similar
discussion regarding to entering and exiting firms.
Models of firm and industry frictions, which can stem from several different causes in-
cluding market regulations, highlight several possible channels of impact. First, competition
from reform may cause reallocation of production factors across firms. More competition by
new entrants and peers may push firms to increase their efficiency by curtailing costs (Help-
7S¸eker (2012b), Criscuolo, Haskel, and Slaughter (2010), and (Almeida and Fernandes, 2008) provide empirical
evidence on the relationship between FDI and innovation. There are also studies like Haddad and Harrison (1993)
and Sinha (1993) that find a positive impact of foreign ownership on firms’ productivity levels.
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man and Krugman (1985)) , concentrate on products of firms comparative advantage(Bernard,
Redding, and Schott, 2011) , raise incentives to innovate in order to respond to the threat of
new firm entries ((Aghion et al., 2005)) and so on.
To discipline our thinking on firm product innovation, we borrow equation 1 from Lentz
and Mortensen (2008) which describes the optimality condition for innovation rate decision
of firms in their stylized model. λ is the the innovation rate that firm is expected to innovate
new products for each of its existing products given that firm invests c(λ) amount on R&D.
c′(λ) is the marginal cost of investing on R&D and the right hand side of the equation is the
marginal benefit from this investment. pi(ϕ)−wc(λ) is the per-period net profit from inventing
a new product. r is the market interest rate and µ is the exogenous destruction rate for each
existing product.
Based on the motivation provided by the analytical model , the empirical analysis mea-
sures the impact of the licensing reform on the change in product mix of firms. The impact
of reform can be incorporated in the model in several ways. Restuccia and Rogerson (2008)
analyze the effects of policy distortions on firm performance where they formalize these dis-
tortions as output tax. They find that distortions in firms’ profits can lead to sizable decreases
in productivity. A similar interpretation is also used in Hsieh and Klenow (2009). They in-
troduce a tax on output for firms that face government restrictions on size or that face high
transportation costs. Interpreting policy distortion as an output tax can be applied in the
model presented above. Being required to provide a license to increase capacity or start a new
product line firms have to deal with government officials which is likely to take time and it is
costly. This distortion can be considered as a tax on firm’s profit or revenue. License require-
ments prevents firms from responding quickly to the changes in market conditions and lead
to loss of competitiveness.
c′(λ) =
pi(ϕ)− wc(λ)
r + µ− λ (1)
An alternative way to model licensing requirement is introducing it as a tax on innovation
costs particularly because one of the activities that require license is starting a new product
line. Such a license requirement would provide disincentive to invest in R&D which will
result in reduction of innovative effort. In the model, representation of the distortion caused
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by license requirement either as a tax on profit or on R&D investment is analogous to each
other. In the first order condition presented in equation 1, if this distortion is represented as
a tax τR > 0 on R&D investment we get the condition in equation 2,
(1 + τR)c
′(λ) =
pi(ϕ)− (1 + τR)wc(λ)
r + µ− λ (2)
In this equation, higher distortion in innovation cost simultaneously increases the marginal
cost and decreases the marginal benefit of innovation which results in a lower level of λ. If we
divide both sides of the equation by we get the result in equation 3
c′(λ) =
pi(ϕ)
(1+τR)
− wc(λ)
r + µ− λ (3)
In this equation since 1/(1+τR) < 0 , it is equivalent to a tax on profit or revenue level (1−
τpi = 1/(1 + τR)) . In either representation of licensing requirements, we see that it increases
the opportunity cost of investing in R&D and results in lower innovation performance. This
relationship is represented in Figure 2. When tax on profit level is imposed, marginal benefit
of innovation shifts downward causing a decline in the optimal value of innovation rate from
λ1 to λ2.
[Fig. 2 about here.]
Finally, product growth rates of firms can be affected by the other policy reforms that took
place in India. The importance of trade policies was discussed in the previous section. Gold-
berg et al. (2010b) and (Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011) show how reductions in tariff rates
increased introduction of new varieties and improved productivity. To control for the effects
of trade reforms, we include tariff rates at NIC4 industry level.
3.1. Baseline Specifications
We start by examining the impact of delicensing on number of products of individual firms.
The main variables of interest are the indicator variables for the years following the the
reforms. Delicen1it and Delicen2it are the indicator variables that takes value 1 only for the
year after and the second year after industry of the firm is deregulated, respectively and 0,
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otherwise. Our approach is to compare innovative output of firms delicensed firms in the first
and second year after delicensing with the same firms’ innovation in other years as well as
innovation of firms in the control group which are either the ones delicensed before 1989 or
the ones that are never delicensed.
Using a measure that spans the entire life of a firm after reform is perhaps the most
economically relevant measure. However, firm innovations long after the reform naturally
tend to capture macroeconomic and firm-specific shocks more so than the impact of reform,
which is our main interest. The choice of only two years is also due to the data attrition and
the catch-up between the firms that are delicensed earlier versus later. These two issues will
also be discussed shortly.
log(nit) = β0 + β1Delicen1it + β2Delicen2it + θ4Industry4t−1 + γi + µIndustry2,t + εit (4)
nit is the product scope (number of products) of firm i at year t. Industry4t−1 are the control
variables which are the lagged values of the three policy reform measures: output tariff OTar-
iff, input tariff ITariff, and industry level foreign direct investment openness measure FDI.
γi is firm fixed effect which controls for all time-invariant firm characteristics. µIndustry2,t is
NIC2-year fixed effect where NIC2 is the 2-digit NIC industry of the firm and accounts for all
yearly macro and industry-specific shocks including NIC2 level demand or supply volatilities
across years. To allow for correlation of error terms, we report robust standard errors that
are heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustered at the industry(NIC2) level. In all specifica-
tions we use lagged tariff and FDI variables because the changes in all of these variables are
unlikely to have impact on firm product scope instantaneously.8
Our identification strategy depends on the intertemporal and across-industry variation in-
dustrial policy. Specifically, our strategy exploits the specific timing as well as the differential
degree of deregulation across industries to identify the impact of delicensing reform on firms’
innovation behavior. We study not only the impact of industrial policy on firm product scope
8One other specification option is including Tfpt−1 as a control variable. Since such an inclusion causes losing
around 10% of observations we do not prefer to keep it in the baseline specifications. However, we tried regressions
including Tfpt−1 as another control and we neither detected a significant change in power and magnitude of the
estimated coefficients nor the Tfpt−1 variable had a significant effect on firm product scope. These results are
also available upon request.
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which accounts for product innovation but also firm sales revenues even after controlling for
firm product scope, which can proxy the extent of process innovation.
[Table 4 about here.]
Table 4 reports the baseline results for firm product scope in nine columns. In column 1, we
find that in the year after delicensing average product scope of a firm in a delicensed industry
grows by 3.2%. One year may not be long enough to observe the unfolding effect of delicensing.
In column 2 we add another dummy variableDelicen2 to capture the impact in the second year
after delicensing. We find that the total impact scattered over two years add up to almost 8%.
We also realize that adding Delicen2 causes an increase in the estimated impact of Delicen1.
In fact, this is an expected outcome when the impact of delicensing is spread over multiple
years. If we do not include Delicen2, observations with higher n’s due to delicensing are
treated as control group observations and hence biases the estimated coefficient downwards.
In column 3, we add Delicen3 to capture the impact on the third year following a reform,
as well. We cannot detect a significant impact on the third year. As it is also noticed in
the number of observations for each specification, we can enrich the specifications by adding
more Delicen variables at the expense of losing more observations. This attrition of the data
is because of the unbalanced nature of the data.
The specifications in columns 1-3 control for firm and industry(NIC2)-year fixed effects,
other factors such as the concurrent trade liberalization reforms may affect firm performance.
Hence, in columns 4-6 we introduce three additional variables to account for the impact of
these reforms. Specifically, we control for input tariff Itariff , output tariff Otariff and FDI.
If the licensing reform across industries and over time is correlated with the process of tariff
reduction and openness to FDI, then the empirical strategy could erroneously attribute the
impact of these other reforms to licensing reform. With addition of these Industry4t−1 vari-
ables which are at NIC4 level industries we still find similar magnitudes for the Delicen vari-
ables. We cannot get any significant coefficient for these variables in columns 4 & 5 whereas
we observe negative and somewhat significant impact of FDI on product scope. Our inclusion
of industry(NIC2)-year fixed effects seems to capture a significant variation and hence we
cannot find strong estimates for Industry4t−1 variables. We use the specification in column 5
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as our baseline specification in our following analysis due to the aforementioned reasons.
Columns 7-9 displays the gradual impact of adding fixed effects to the regression speci-
fication. In column 7, no fixed effects are introduced. Only the Industry4t−1 variables are
controlled for. In column 8 only industry-year fixed effect is accounted for and in column
9 only firm fixed effects are controlled for. These results also show how important it is to
take firm and industry-year fixed effects into account for measuring the actual impact of the
reform.
In the regression sample average yearly firm product scope growth for the treatment group
after treatment is 4.37%, and the reform explains 2.47/4.37=57% and 1.62/4.37=37% of the
growth in the first and second years following the reform, respectively.9 for the treatment
group after treatment.
In the estimations, coefficients of tariff rates are not significant. However Goldberg et al.
(2010b) find significant increase in product growth rate caused by the reduction in input tar-
iffs. Our analysis differs from their study in several ways. In their model input tariff rates are
used as instruments for a conventional price index and a variety index. They show that both
indices affect product growth. According to their model lower tariffs lead to lower prices of
inputs which result in increased imported varieties. Higher use of varieties is associated with
an expansion of firm scope. In the estimations of product growth they do not control for the
licensing reform. Moreover the model presented in their study does not show the dynamics of
product evolution.
FDI reform is another factor that can affect innovation performances of firms. It can re-
duce the cost of innovation by increasing R&D capacity or lowering capital and transactions
costs. Using the Prowess database, Vishwasrao and Bosshardt (2001) find that foreign own-
ership is among the variables that impact a firm’s probability of adoption new technology.
The baseline results of column 5 confirms the positive impact of FDI reform using a more de-
tailed product information. The estimation results presented in Table 4 columns 4-9 provide a
complete set of controls of policy reforms during the time period included in the analysis. Ac-
counting for the other two major reform areas, licensing reform significantly increases product
creation rates.
92.47 and 1.62 are mean values of 0.049*Delicen1 and 0.033*Delicen2
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Change in number of products is a very neat metric for measuring the impact on innovative
output following the reform. However, changes in sales revenue and measured productivity
can be other reflections of the change in innovative output, and may represent improvements
in process innovation. In Table 5 we examine the impact of the reform on firms’ real sales
and productivity. In the year after delicensing on average real firm sales grows by 17.7% and
in the second year after the reform sales grow by 8.8% (column 1 of Table 5). In column 2,
we examine the impact on firms’ total factor productivity (Tfp), and delicensing boosts firm
productivity by 3.8% in the year following the reform. This finding is also in line with the
findings of (Chari, 2011) where delicensing reform is responsible for a 5-6% aggregate TFP
improvement.
In column 3, we rerun the sales revenue regression of column 1 controlling for also the
product scope of firms. With this additional control we still find positive and significant coef-
ficients for the reform dummies which is consistent with the presence of process innovations
after reform. Now reform dummies measure the impact of process innovation or quality up-
grades of products on firms’ sales revenues . We also find the coefficient for log(n) to be 0.109
which means that if a single-product firm adds one more product to its scope its sales rev-
enue is expected to grow by 10.9 percent. We still find coefficients for the Delicen variables
at similar magnitudes with the ones in column 1 and it implies that process and quality im-
provements on "cash cow" products are not affected very much from accounting for the new
product innovations. It may also take longer time periods to increase customer awareness for
the new products and construct distribution channels for them.
As we suspect if adding log(nt) as an explanatory variable while explaining log(salest) may
cause some simultaneity problem in column 4 we use per-product sales revenue log(salest/nt)
as the dependent variable and again we get significant coefficient estimates for the impact of
deregulation.
Although the unexpected development of the reforms has already been discussed, in columns
5-6 we use Delicen1 and Delicen2 as instruments of contemporaneous Tfpt so that we can iso-
late the Tfp channel of delicensing on firm product scope and sales. Contemporaneous Tfp
is expected to be correlated with both firm product scope and sales. Hence, by instrumenting
Tfpt with the reform dummies we segregate the the effect on product scope and sales through
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the increase in Tfp induced by the reform. We get larger effects compared to the OLS effects.
One percent increase in Tfp caused by the delicensing increases firm product scope and sales
by 1.4% and 2.8%, respectively. Compared to the OLS results for Delicen1 and Delicen2, these
high numbers indicate that some other channels that the delicensing reform interacts with
have dampening impacts on the size of the Tfp channel.
As Table 3 highlighted almost half of the observations were delicensed before 1989 and
they make make up most of our control group. Hence, what we identify with the delicensing
reform dummies measure a catch-up between the firms that are delicensed early and rela-
tively later. Results also highlight that this catch-up takes up to two years and coefficients
start becoming insignificant afterwards.
[Table 5 about here.]
Table 5 shows that unlike in Aghion et al. (2008) licensing reform significantly increases
sales. Although the estimation method and the controls used in this study differs from those
used in Aghion et al. (2008), magnitude of the coefficient is quite higher than 3.1 percent
increase obtained in their study. However the coefficient in their estimation is not significant.
Aghion et al. (2008) can only show the impact of licensing reform on industry sales through
its differential effect on states with varying levels of labor regulations. They show in Table 2 of
their study that without the interaction terms, licensing reform does not have any impact on
sales. We test the direct relationship between licensing reform and log(sales) using firm-level
data from Prowess and find a positive and significant relationship.
The average yearly Tfp and sales growth rates are are 1.74% and 7.27% in the treatment
group after the treatment, and estimated coefficients indicate that delicensing reform causes
growth in firm Tfp and sales even larger than the yearly average growth rates (corresponding
coefficients are 0.038 and 0.177). In the second year after the reform 46%(0.8/1.74) of Tfp
growth and 60%(4.33/7.26) of sales growth are due to the impact of delicensing reforms.
The results indicate that delicensing reform hikes the two mentioned forms of firm inno-
vation -product and process innovation- through boosting firm productivity. These findings
are in line with the findings of (Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011), (Aghion et al., 2005, 2008,
2009), (Chamarbagwala and Sharma, 2011), and (Chari, 2011)
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3.2. Subsamples
As discussed in Section 2.1 several other reforms were concurrently put into place in India,
and we tried to control for them by including the Itariff , Otariff and FDI variables along
with the NIC2-year fixed effects. But if we still suspect about some unpurged impact of these
reforms we can rerun the same specifications by excluding the firms that are affected the
most from these other reforms. The economic reforms that took place around 1991 did not
affect all industries in the same magnitude. Share of products that were opened to FDI and
tariff rate reductions were not homogeneous across industries. Among the firms that had
tariff reductions or FDI liberalization, the ones with the highest reduction are more likely
to increase their innovation rates. We exclude firms that belong to industries that had the
highest benefit from these reforms as a robustness test.
The results with sub-samples are presented in Table 6. In three panels we present the
impact on log(n), log(sales) and log(Tfp), respectively. In the first column we exclude 4-digit
industries that had more than half of the industry liberalized in FDI by 1995. We see that
the baseline result (Table 4 column 5) on number of products is quite robust to this exclusion
while the results for log(sales) and log(Tfp) lose some power. In column 2, we exclude the top
quartile of industries that had the highest drops in output tariff rates between 1989 and 1995.
Again the estimated coefficients are at the same order of magnitude with some small swings
around the baseline results. In column 3 we exclude top quartile of industries that had the
highest drops in input tariffs for the same time period. In all three columns licensing reform
significantly increases innovation performances of firms which provide further support that
the relationship between licensing reforms and innovation that we exhibited in the previous
sections is not affected by these other reforms.
[Table 6 about here.]
We also want to be sure if the results have been driven by only a subcategory of firms
not only due to their exposure to other reforms but also some other firm characteristics such
import and export orientations or employee skill level of a firm. In his survey on technol-
ogy diffusion, Keller (2004) summarizes theoretical and empirical literature on how imports
provide knowledge and technology transfer in a macroeconomic setting. Using micro-level
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data from developing countries Almeida and Fernandes (2008) and S¸eker (2012b) provide ev-
idence on importing and exporting firms being more innovative. Criscuolo et al. (2010) reach
a similar conclusion on the contribution of exporting on innovation for British firms. In the
fourth and fifth columns of Table 6 we exclude export oriented and import oriented indus-
tries, respectively. The coefficient of licensing reform indicators continues to be significant
with magnitudes similar to their whole sample counterparts.
Another test with sub-samples is with employee income levels. Industries with high wage
payments are likely to employ more skilled workers and produce more knowledge embodied
products. This could facilitate the innovation activities in high-wage paying industries. In the
last column we exclude the top quartile of the industries with the highest wage payments.10
These results indicate that the firms that are likely to employ less skilled workers are the ones
that experience more increase in their product scope. The size of coefficients of interest almost
doubles (from 0.049 to 0.106 and from 0.033 to 0.083 for Delicen1 and Delicen2, respectively)
with exclusion of firms with high skilled workers. However, the impact of reform is dampened
for log(sales) and Tfp
Some of the industries went through multiple reforms and the sub-sample used in each
column of Table 6 could include overlapping industries which could affect the results. Al-
though there are industries that have been included in multiple groups, their numbers are
not large with a possible exception of industries with highest input and output tariff drops.
50 percent of firms that belong to industries in the top quartile of input tariff drop also exist
in industries that are in the top quartile of output tariff drop.11 The overlap of industries
among other groups is much smaller.
3.3. Which Industries are Affected More?
Our main finding so far is that the delicensing reform caused a significant increase in
deregulated firms’ innovative performance. To understand what firm and industry charac-
teristics are effective in this process, in this subsection we trace the impact of delicensing on
firms of different characteristics. Industries are likely to vary in intrinsic volatility of demand
10The wage data is from 1987 Annual Survey of Industries database.
11This is expected as input tariffs are constructed using output tariffs and input-output table of production.
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and supply shocks due to differences in technological or market characteristics which affect
innovation performance. (Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011) show that certain industry groups
like basic goods, capital goods, and intermediate goods had substantial reduction in non-tariff
barriers which could affect their innovation capacity. Studies like S¸eker (2012b) and (Almeida
and Fernandes, 2008) show that exporting firms are more innovative than non-trading firms.
Table 7 reports the results. In column 1, the coefficients on the interaction of Delicen and
export-oriented firm dummy is positive and significant for both years after delicensing. The
coefficient estimates (0.090 and 0.088 for the two years following a delicensing) imply that
average number of products of a delicensed firm is expected to grow by 9% and 8.8% in the
year after and the second year after delicensing.
Column 2-4 reports the impact on consumer durables producer, intermediate good pro-
ducer and basic goods producer firms. The interaction term for the first year after delicensing
and intermediate good producer is negative for both consumer durables and intermediate
goods producers but not significant for intermedite good producers whereas the similar coef-
ficient for the second year following a delicensing indicates that compared to remaining firms
that produce consumer durables and intermediate goods do not expand their product scope
following a delicensing and their product scope shrinks by 4,6% and 11.5% by the second year
after reform. Using interactions of variables of firm characteristics with theDelicen variables,
we also check the following firm characteristics: if a firm is in an import-competing sector, if
it is a capital good, consumer non-durables producer, if it is a foreign or government owned
company or a group company. We cannot detect any significant interaction of the listed firm
characteristics and the delicensing reform.12
[Table 7 about here.]
Delicen variables vary across 430 distinct NIC4-year pairs and so far we have been con-
trolling for NIC2-year fixed effects to control for the idiosyncratic shocks that hit industries
and firms over time other than the delicensing reform. We can increase the level of control
to NIC3-year fixed effects at the expense of absorbing a great fraction of variation which is
12None of the listed firm characteristics pass the Chow tests which means that subsamples of firms that differ
from each other along the listed characteristics are disparately affected.
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expected to identify the Delicen variables. Columns 5-7 of the table display the results with
NIC3-year fixed effects. Although the time composition and levels slightly change, we still get
positive and significant impact of delicensing on innovative performance of firms.
3.4. Placebo
To check if what we find so far as the link between delicensing reform and firms’ innovative
output is results of a time varying unobservable that even our strict set of fixed fixed effects
cannot account for. To this end, we create synthetic Delicen variables by treating the year and
two years before and actual delicensing as a placebo reform. Results for this specification is
presented in columns 1-3 of Table 8. For the number of products, sales and Tfp specifications
we cannot identify any significant coefficient for the synthetic (placebo) variables.
[Table 8 about here.]
By its construction our data is not suitable for analysis of firm entry and exit as it is al-
ready discussed in section 2.1. However, there still is some firm turnover in the data. To see if
this turnover hurts health of the findings we restrict the sample to firms that unremittingly
have information throughout the 1991-95 period. Results of this specification is presented
in columns 4-6 of Table 8 and it is observed that none of the previously found results lose
statistical significance and magnitudes of the coefficients are quite stark against this test.
This restriction does not change significance of the coefficient estimates for the reform vari-
ables dramatically. Hence, these results confirm that although the entry/exit margin of firms
might contribute to improvements in firm innovation and product scope, it does not drive the
findings so far.
3.5. Economic Environment
In this section, we investigate if characteristics of the states that firms operate in have an
influence on firms’ response to the reform. The characteristics that are analyzed are being a
coastal or non-coastal state, being a highly financially developed state or not and being a state
with pro-employer labor regulations or vice versa. In unreported results we interacted the
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mentioned state characteristics with Delicen variables and we could not detect any significant
interaction coefficients for none of the outcome variables log(n), log(sales) and log(Tfp).
Table9 exhibits the regression results where the sample is split into two along the men-
tioned state characteristics. being located at a coastal may ease transportation opportunities
and also may increase foreign competition or allow access to a more diverse set of intermediate
goods. Columns 1 and 2 tests this hypothesis. However, we cannot find significant differences
across coastal and non-coastal states.
Indian states also show variation in access to external finance. Financial development
can be an important facilitator for innovation by allowing firms to spare more resources for
investments in R&D. We define a state as financially developed if the average state credit
level per capita is above median. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 9 shows the result for firms
from high and low financially developed states, respectively. Licensing reform has a larger
benefit on firms that are located in states that are financially more developed. This finding
could be interpreted as follows. Easier access to finance helps firms take advantage of the
liberation. Thus the states that have sufficient financial development might have outperform
in innovation activities upon delicensing. The level of financial development of the state of a
firm does not seems to cause too big differences for the estimated impact of reform on log(sales)
and log(Tfp), either .
India is a federal democracy and industrial relations fall under the joint jurisdiction of
central and state governments in the constitution. Labor regulations are affected by both ju-
risdictions. Although all states have the same starting labor regulations, they have diverged
from one another over time. Besley and Burgess (2004) divide states into three groups: pro-
worker, pro-employer, and neutral. A state has a pro-worker labor regulation if the legisla-
tions benefited workers compared to employers. They show that states which had pro-worker
labor regulations experienced lower output, employment, investment, and productivity in reg-
istered or formal manufacturing sector. Following their work, Aghion et al. (2008) find that
when licensing reform occurred, industries in states with pro-worker regulations experienced
less increase in output and employment relative to pro-employer states. These differences
across states can affect firms’ innovation performances. Aghion et al. (2008) use a dataset at
industry level obtained from ASI which prevents them from analyzing firm dynamics.
20
In the Prowess database some firms provided information on the geographic location of
their headquarters. Following Besley and Burgess (2004) we set a dummy equal to one if the
firm is located in a state that has pro-worker labor regulations. We analyzed whether the
relationship between licensing reform and innovation varied with the labor regulations in the
states. However, we could not find a significant relationship between innovation and labor
regulations.
[Table 9 about here.]
3.6. Treatment on Treated
One other concern about the measured impact of reform on firm product scope is the possi-
bility of cross industry product innovations such that a firm from an already delicensed sector
or a never-delicensed sector may prefer to enter the newly delicensed sector by innovating
new products for this sector. Such observations may cause an underestimation of the impact
of delicensing. To address this concern we estimate a treatment on treated effect by restrict-
ing the sample to firms which are ever delicensed in the sample period and the firm survived
at least one year after the reform. We present the results in table 10. In columns 1 and 2
the coefficient estimates for the reform dummies are quite larger than the baseline estima-
tions and the results are statistically significant. While the impact over the two years after
reform on product scope is measured to be around eight percent column 2 implies 26% and
20% increases in the first two years after a reform.
[Table 10 about here.]
When we compare column 4 of Table10 with column 1 of Table 5 we realize that the impact
in the second year after reform is far higher than what is measured for the same coefficient
in Table 5. Similarly when column 6 of Table 10 is compared with column 3 of Table 5 again
the the impact is far higher and significant for the second year after reform and the impact
for the first year is dampened.
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3.7. Dynamic Model Estimation
One other concern may be controlling for lagged dependent variables model estimation.
Table 11 estimates the same outcome variables, log(n), log(sales), log(tfp), controlling for their
lagged values using the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator returns estimates similar or
slightly weaker in both magnitude and significance. But still we find significant impact of
reform on firm innovation and productivity within two-years after the reform. We should also
mention that the estimates for the impact of delicensing from both the direct and indirect
approaches are not exactly comparable.
[Table 11 about here.]
Since the Arellano-Bouver/Blundell-Bond estimator uses first differences, firm fixed effects
are already washed away. When we try to add NIC2 or NIC2-year fixed effected variance-
covariance matrix of the two-step estimator is not full rank. Hence we introduce only year
fixed effects into the estimation. The measured impact of delicensing on product scope and
sales revenue, presented in columns 1-3 of Table 11, is lower when compared to the estimates
in Tables 4 and 5. However, both magnitude and significance is slightly higher for log(Tfp).
4. Conclusion
This study investigates the impact of regulatory environment on the success of firms’ inno-
vative efforts. Using data from Indian manufacturing sector, it focuses on a particular reform
on license requirements of firms. This reform liberalized product markets in introducing
new products, increasing capacities, and establishing new plants. It employs a difference-in-
differences strategy including firm and industry-year fixed effects in its baseline examination.
The analysis shows that the reform significantly increased the rate at which firms introduce
new product varieties to the market, product innovation, along with the sales revenue even
after accounting for the increase in firm product scope, process innovation. This key find-
ing stands out against a variety of robustness exercises, passes placebo tests. In addition to
the licensing reform, India had several major economic reforms on liberalizing trade and al-
lowing foreign ownership. The relationship between licensing reform and innovation is also
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robust to inclusion of controls for these reforms. Innovation activities have been accepted as
the engine of growth. This study shows the importance of regulatory environment to prosper
in innovation activities which has an important policy implication. In order to fully benefit
from investments in human capital and physical capital to achieve sustainable growth and in-
creased welfare, a favorable investment climate is required. The inefficiencies in investment
climate will leave the efforts to improve the economy and increase innovation incomplete.
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Appendix A. Definitions of key variables
Appendix B. Data compilation
We use the data on licensing reform compiled by Aghion et al. (2008). They use various
issues of Handbook of Industrial Policy and Statistics, press notes, and notifications issued
by the federal government to code when different industries were exempted from industrial
licensing.
We obtain the data on tariff rates at four digit industry level from (Topalova and Khan-
delwal, 2011). They construct a database of annual tariff rates at 6-digit level according to
Indian Trade Classification Harmonized System Code based on various publications of the
Ministry of Finance. Then they match the products at 6-digit with 4-digit NIC codes using
the concordance by Debroy and Santhanam (1993) to calculate average industry level tariffs.
These industry-level output tariffs are combined with input-output transaction table from
1993-1994 to calculate the input tariffs.
We also use the data compiled by (Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011) which is a 4-digit
industry level, time varying measure of openness to foreign direct investment. They obtain
the data from the publications of Handbook of Industrial Statistics.
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Fig. 1. Average Product Scope and Real Sales by Treatment Status
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Fig. 2. Licensing Reform and Innovation
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max No of Obs.
Delicen1 overall 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 N = 7,426
between 0.08 0.00 1.00 n = 1,992
within 0.22 -0.44 0.92
Delicen2 overall 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 N = 6,145
between 0.09 0.00 1.00 n = 1,723
within 0.24 -0.43 0.92
Delicen3 overall 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 N = 5,172
between 0.08 0.00 0.50 n = 1,563
within 0.25 -0.43 0.93
# products overall 1.95 1.67 1.00 32.00 N = 7,426
between 1.38 1.00 26.33 n = 1,992
within 0.52 -20.38 7.62
Sales overall 176 1020 0.00 341145 N = 7,426
between 797 0.00 27412 n = 1,992
within 123 -3273 6880
Tfp overall 0.04 0.28 -1.15 1.07 N = 6,896
between 0.28 -1.15 1.07 n = 1,877
within 0.10 -1.03 0.70
Itariff overall 0.76 0.28 0.14 3.51 N = 7,426
between 0.22 0.14 3.51 n = 1,992
within 0.16 -0.16 1.73
Otariff overall 0.27 0.09 0.04 0.55 N = 7,426
between 0.07 0.04 0.54 n = 1,992
within 0.05 0.13 0.44
FDI overall 0.30 0.39 0.00 1.00 N = 7,426
between 0.33 0.00 1.00 n = 1,992
within 0.27 -0.45 1.05
Add overall 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 N = 6,458
between 0.19 0.00 1.00 n = 1,812
within 0.24 -0.57 0.93
Drop overall 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 N = 6,458
between 0.09 0.00 1.00 n = 1,812
within 0.14 -0.47 0.86
Notes: Data covers 1989-1995 period. N and n represents total number of observations and
number of firms, respectively. Between component measures variation between firms while
within component measures variation over time.
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Table 3: Percentage of Firms that are in Delicensed Industries
Year % Delicensed Total # of Firms
1989 0.43 762
1990 0.45 973
1991 0.45 1,187
1992 0.88 1,293
1993 0.89 1,494
1994 0.91 1,934
1995 0.91 2,334
This table presents the fraction firms whose transactions are already delicensed in a given
year (% Delicensed) alonf with the number of firms in the sample for that year.
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Table 11:
Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond
VARIABLES log(n) log(sales) log(Tfp)
(1) (2) (3)
Delicen1 0.025* 0.025 0.028***
(0.015) (0.019) (0.009)
Delicen2 0.023 0.055** 0.030***
(0.016) (0.022) (0.010)
Otariff 0.015 0.088 -0.033
(0.045) (0.055) (0.024)
Itariff -0.021 -0.641** -0.169
(0.167) (0.296) (0.112)
FDI 0.008 0.037 0.003
(0.022) (0.033) (0.013)
Constant 0.077 1.642*** 0.044
(0.056) (0.295) (0.039)
Observations 5,292 5,291 4,843
# firms 1,542 1,542 1,451
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Lagged dep. var. Yes Yes Yes
Wald (p value) 0 0 0
AR(1) test pval 7.30e-11 0.0127 0
AR(2) test pval 0.895 0.262 0.128
# instruments 31 31 31
This table presents the regression estimates for the delicensing for the delicensing reform on
firm product scope log(n), sales revenue log(sales) and productivity log(Tfp) using Arellano-
Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator. Delicen1 and Delicen2 are the indicator variables that takes
value 1 only for the year after and the second year after industry of the firm is deregulated,
respectively and 0, otherwise. OTariff and ITariff are input and output tariffs for firms of
NIC4 level industries, FDI is the foreign direct investment openness measure for an industry.
Estimation also includes a constant term. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses
beneath coefficient estimates. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant
at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
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